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accept defendant's letter of authorization, permitting it to tow
trucks from the Thruway, it also accepted the defendant's
terms,2 including the defendant's right to revoke authorization
without prior notice.? 8
The federal and state law both accord governmental agencies
great discretion and authority in promulgating rules and
procedures relating to government contracts or programs. In
order to succeed on a due process claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that he has a property interest.?39 Such property
interest is derived not from the Federal or State Constitutions, but
from an independent source such as state law or other authority.""O
However, when an agency retains significant discretion over
participation in a government program, the plaintiff will be
subject to the terms of the contract it signed with the government
24
agency. '

SUPREME COURT
GENESSEE COUNTY
2
Daniel S. v. DowlingI1
(decided April 28, 1997)

In February 1994, petitioner Daniel S., a ten year old boy was
allegedly abused by his father, who was separated from his
mother.243 The Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and
Maltreatment [hereinafter "SCR"] was notified and an
investigation was made according to the regulatory procedures.' "
This action was filed on Daniel's behalf, pursuant to Article 78 of
2233 78

d. at 86, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
Id. at 83, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 805.

239 Loyal Tire, at 82, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
24 Loyal Tire, at 86, 652 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806-07.
241 Id.

410
243
244

172 Misc. 2d 619, 660 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. Genessee County 1997).
Id. at 620, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 290.

Id.
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New York Civil Practice Law and Rules [hereinafter "CPLR"],245
contending that the regulatory provisions do not afford him due
process, and that the review undertaken here also did not provide
due process.246

After a hearing on these issues, the court held that the
regulatory scheme does not contain provisions to allow a reported
child victim to seek review of an investigative determination or to
even be notified of such a finding. 27 The regulations therefore
failed to provide due process for a child victim to challenge an
unfounded report. 23 In addition, the minor was further deprived
of due process where the challenge to the determination resulted
in no change. 249 The court concluded that Daniel was "not
afforded due process to enforce his rights to be protected." 2
Following the alleged abuse by his father, the local police and
SCR were notified3 5 '
The local child protection service
investigated the incident with a resultant determination of

Id. at 621, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 290. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney
1994). Article 78 provides:
Except where otherwise provided by law, a proceeding under
this article shall not be used to challenge a determination: 1.
which is not final or can be adequately reviewed by appeal to
a court or to some other body or officer or where the body or
officer making the determination is expressly authorized by
statute to rehear the matter upon the petitioner's application
unless the determination to be reviewed was made upon a
rehearing, or a rehearing has been denied, or the time within
which the petitioner can procure a rehearing has
elapsed ....
Id.
246 Daniel S., 172 Misc. 2d at 621, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 290. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. This amendment states: "No person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id. N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 6. This section provides, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." Id.
247 DanielS., 172 Misc. 2d at 621, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
411 Id. at 630, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
249 Id. at 621, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
0
25
Id. at 630, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
25 Id. at 620, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
245
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"unfounded." 5 The "[u]nfounded" determination meant that
"the investigation did not find some credible evidence of the
SCR was notified of the
alleged abuse or maltreatment.""
and
unfounded determination pursuant to regulations,25
subsequently informed the father, the subject of this investigation,
and the mother, the other named person in the report.' No other
person was notified and, eventually, records of the report and
This was mandated by, and
investigation were expunged.
consistent with the statute and regulations.w Consequently, the
child's mother filed a petition against the child's father asserting
that the father committed a "family offense against the child,"
and a law guardian was appointed to represent the child. M Upon
learning that the investigation of the child abuse report yielded an
"unfounded determination," the guardian contacted the Buffalo
regional office of the New York State Department of Social
Services requesting an administrative review of this unfounded
determination by the local districtY9 The review rendered no
change in the determination, and the instant proceeding was filed
2nId.

18, §432.1(0 provides:
2
Id. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
"[u]nfounded report means any report made, unless an investigation
determines that some credible evidence of the alleged abuse or maltreatment
exists." Id. (emphasis added).
N.Y. CoMP.
2 Daniel S., 172 Misc. 2d at 620, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
18, § 432.3(k) provides that the SCR should be notified
CODES R. & REGS. tit.
if the determination is unfounded.
211 Daniel S., 172 Misc.2d at 620, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 289-90. N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 432.9(b) states that SCR will
inform the subject(s) and other persons named in the report,
except children under the age of 18 years, that the report was
unfounded and he records of the report were sealed, or were
expunged if the report had been received by the State Central
Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment prior to February
12, 1996.

Id.

DanielS., 172 Misc. 2d at 620, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
2 Id. at 621, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 290. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 18, § 432.9.
25

231 Daniel S., 172 Misc. 2d at 621, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
259 Id.
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on the child's behalf.2'
Daniel sought declaration that the
regulatory provisions violated his due process rights by not
providing meaningful review. 2 1 Daniel sought relief from the
determination "at least to the extent of a due process review."262
The court rejected respondent's argument that the court was
without authority to issue a declaratory judgment in an Article 78
proceeding. 263 Therefore, the court was obligated to declare the
rights of the parties.264
In the case of In re Edwin L,26 the New York Court of
Appeals applied a balancing test, as enunciated in Matthews v.
Eldridge,266 to determine whether adequate due process
protections were afforded in a particular situation by the state. 67
The Matthews Court stated that "[d]ue process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands[,]" and "[a]ccordingly, resolution of the issue whether
the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally
sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private
261

id.

261 Id.
262 id.
263

Id.

Id. In Allen v. Coombe, 225 A.D. 2d 1084, 639 N.Y.S.2d 197 (4th
Dep't 1996), Muslim inmates brought an Article 78 petition contending that
they were improperly restricted from practicing their religion in a correctional
facility. Id. at 1084, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The petition was denied by the
lower court, but the appellate court modified this order, stating that even
though this proceeding was brought pursuant to Article 78, the lower court
should have declared the parties' rights. Id. at 1084, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 197-98.
265 88 N.Y.2d 593, 671 N.E.2d 1247, 648 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1996).
266 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). In Mathews, petitioner was notified of the
possibility of termination of disability benefits which were, in fact, later
terminated. Id. at 323-24. The issue presented was "whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social
Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity
for an evidentiary hearing."
Id. at 323.
The Court held that the
administrative procedures undertaken comported with Due Process and an
evidentiary hearing was not required prior to termination of such benefits. Id.
at 349.
267 In re Edwin, 88 N.Y.2d at 600, 671 N.E.2d at 1249-50, 648 N.Y.S.2d at
852-53; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
264
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interests that are affected."
test by stating that

'

963

The Court announced its balancing

[P]rior decisions indicate that due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First,
the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.' 9
In its analysis of the first prong of the Matthews test, the
Daniel S. court found that the legislature recognized the private
interest of adequately protecting children from abuse and neglect
by their parents and other caretakers? 0 In doing so, the SCR was
created and a procedure for reporting and investigating suspected
child abuse and neglect was in place.27 ' The court concluded that
the private interests of the child will be affected by the regulatory
scheme.m

I- Id. at 334-35 (citing Morrisey V. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)
(other citations omitted).
I Id. at 334-35 (citations omitted).
270 DanielS., 172 Misc. 2d at 622-23, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
The legislative
27 Daniel S., 172 Misc. 2d at 623, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
purpose clause of the Social Services Law, Section 411 stated:
Abused and maltreated children in this state are in urgent
need of an effective child protective service to prevent them
from suffering further injury and impairment. It is the
purpose of this title to encourage more complete reporting of
suspected child abuse and maltreatment and to establish in
each county of the state a child protective service capable of
investigating such reports swiftly and competently and
capable of providing protection for the child or children from
further abuse or maltreatment and rehabilitative services for
the child or children and the parents involved.
Id. (citation omitted).
2721d. at 622, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 291.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1998], Art. 25

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 14

Analysis of the second prong of Matthews bears on whether the
procedures challenged would create a risk of erroneous
deprivation.273 The Daniel S. court examined the number of cases
referred by the SCR which resulted in unfounded
determinations. 274 Six witnesses who worked in the system for
many years at the local, regional or state level, testified that they
were unfamiliar with a complaint about an unfounded report.2"
In addition, the court examined the provisions of the
statutory/regulatory scheme to understand whether their testimony
constituted "bureaucratic hubris, or stonewalling ... or... an
institutionalized mindset."

726

Nothing in the statute provides for notice to a minor child
victim, another person on the child's behalf, or the original
reporter, of an unfounded determination. 277 The statute also does

not provide for an objection or review of the unfounded
determination on the child's behalf. 278 But, it does allow the
alleged perpetrator to "challenge the 'indicated' determination
and seek expungement of the records." 279
In contrast, the
statutory scheme essentially treats the child as a non-entity, and in
fact, respondent sought to dismiss the petition claiming the child
lacked standing.2 0 Although apparently a case of first impression
273 Id.

at 623, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
274 Id. Evidence showed that 72.8% of all reports referred by the SCR
resulted in unfounded determinations (approximately 94,000). Id. "In that
year [1995], 128,896 cases of reported child abuse and neglect were referred
for investigation. These cases involved 211,445 different children. In the first
six years of this decade there have been over a half million unfounded
investigations involving nearly one million children." Id.
275 Id. at 623-24, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 291-92.
276 Id. at 624, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
277Id. at 624-25, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 292 (stating that only a mandated reporter
who requested such notification is given notice). See generally N.Y. COMP.
CODE R. & REGS tit. 18, § 432.12.
278 Daniel S., 172 Misc. 2d at 625, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
279 Id. N.Y. SoC. SERv. LAw (McKinney 1997). Section 422(8) provides
that within ninety days, the subject can request that the report be amended
upon an unfounded determination, and if such amendment does not occur, the
subject is entitled to a "fair hearing" scheduled by the department. Id.
" Daniel S., 172 Misc. 2d at 624, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
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legally and administratively, the Daniel S. court concluded that
with no safeguards, the procedures challenged herein create a risk
of erroneous deprivation of the child's right to protection which
can be "ameliorated by additional or substitute procedural
safeguards."2
In its analysis of the third prong of Matthews, to determine the
procedural safeguards due, "the child's interest must be balanced
against the governmental interest involved."232 The interest
identified by the government was cost, to the extent that it would
be "prohibitively expensive" to grant review and hearing rights
where there has been an unfounded determinationYm Testimony
from the SCR's Program Manager attempted to show that cases
in which abuse was indicated amounted to only a third of
unfounded cases, and therefore giving review rights to child
victims would cost three times the expense of the same review
rights to the perpetrators m However, the court did not anticipate
such a high challenge rate, and thus the evidence failed to
establish that the governmental interest outweighs the abused
child's private interest.w Since the statutory/regulatory scheme
contains no provisions for the child "to obtain review of an
unfounded determination or even receive notification thereof, the
law in this State does not provide due process for a reported child
victim to challenge the unfounding of a child abuse or neglect
report. " w
Relying on Fuentes v. Shevin,l the Daniel S. court established
that the process due to child victims with unfounded reports, must
2B

Id. at 624-25, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 292.

n2 Id. at 625, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 292-93. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
at 335.

283 DanielS.,

172 Misc. 2d at 625, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
at 625-26, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
at 626, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
28
6Id.
407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes, suit was brought challenging the
constitutionality of Florida and Pennsylvania replevin provisions which
allowed for seizure of personal property without a hearing or notice to the
other party. Id. at 69-71. The Court found that such seizures amount to a
deprivation of property. Id. at 85. "[Dlue process is afforded only by the
kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' that are aimed at establishing the validity or at
n4 Id.
2 Id.
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include "prompt notice to the child and to the child's parents or
custodian or guardian if other than the parents. " 2s8 Since the
parent or someone close to the parent is often the perpetrator,
notice must be given to "an independent third person designated
by law to act in the child's behalf, which representative would
have the right to review the file which resulted in the unfounded
determination. "211
The Daniel S. court, relying on Morrissey v. Brewer, 0 also
asserted that "due process further requires a review procedure
should the child's representative wish to request review[,]" with
such procedure providing "the opportunity to be heard in person
and to present evidence to a neutral hearing body or officer" in a
timely manner. 29' Abused children should have the same rights as
those given to their alleged perpetrators.2 9 Daniel S. had an
advocate available to file a complaint against the determination
which led to a review by the Buffalo regional office; respondent
contends that this review was sufficient for due process
requirements. 293 However, testimony revealed that the regional
office had never received a similar complaint, and perhaps did
not know how to deal with it since no departmental regulations
existed.2

least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor
before he can be deprived of his property .... ." Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
288 Daniel S., 172 Misc. 2d at 626, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
29 Id. The court suggested the use of an ombudsman to meet this
requirement. Id.
290 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
291 Daniel S., 172 Misc. 2d at 626, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 293 (citing Morrisey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). In Morrissey, petitioners contended that they
were deprived of due process by having their paroles revoked without a
hearing. Id. at 472-73. The Court concluded that the minimum due process
requirements should include written notice of the violations, disclosure of the
evidence used, an opportunity to be heard, to be allowed to present and crossexamine witnesses, and a "neutral and detached" hearing body. Id. at 488-

89).
292

Id.
626-27,
N.Y.S.2d at 293.
Id. at
at 627,
660660
N.Y.S.2d
at 293-94.

293Id.

294
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The request was finally reviewed only after the Law Guardian
made several phone calls, and subsequently requested information
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.m Although the
Guardian expressed concern about "great potential for harm for
the child[,]" no explanation was provided for the delay. M
Additionally, although the regional office was aware that the
determination was questioned, it acted in strict accordance with
the statute and ensured that the record was expunged.w The
Child Abuse Specialist did not verify any information or issues,
did not discuss with the Law Guardian her reason for questioning
the unfounded determination, and did not offer "an opportunity to
be heard," thereby making this a "paper review" only. m
Respondent's final arguments suggested that the court should
not take such precedential steps where the law has previously
been changed to accommodate such events.m However, this only
reflects their misunderstanding of Elisa's Law and the nature of
this case.30 The "child protection laws do not provide as much
protection for victims of child abuse and neglect as is provided
for adult victims of intrafamilial domestic abuse. . .

."

While humanitarian considerations and public concern require
the provision of a system to protect child abuse victims, rn the
current statutory scheme peremptorily denies child abuse victims
the protections of the law. 313 The evidence indicated that "the
m Id. at 627, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
296id.
2 Id.
m Id. at 627-28, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
2
99Id. at 628, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
3 Id. Although Elisa's Law provides for some third party oversight where
services are provided to children, it does not provide notification to the
reported child victim of an unfounded determination, nor of a review
procedure. Id. 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 12, § 5959-A (1996) provides that
Elisa'sLaw is an Act "to amend the social services law, the domestic relations
law, the family court act and the mental hygiene law, in relation to disclosure
of information in the statewide central register of child abuse and maltreatment
and disclosure of reports investigating the deaths of certain children." Id.
301Id.
3 2Id.

at 629, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
33M. at 628-29, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 294-95.
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State created a system where nearly three quarters of accepted
reported cases are unfounded, thus resulting in no protective
services."'
Even though the number of children effected is
almost one million, no provision for review exists on the victim's
behalf, nor has there ever been such a request for a review.3°0
Clearly, there was no system for regular monitoring, and even
when undertaken, it was "infrequent and minuscule" with no
"established procedures or protocol for assessing the validity of
unfounded cases[.]"'0 Due process is not afforded when large
numbers of child abuse and neglect cases are accepted for
investigation, determined to be unfounded, but no review process
is provided by the State for the child victim."
The United States Supreme Court has set forth as guidance
three factors to be considered when addressing issues of due
process. 3°8 These are the private interest that would be affected
by official action, the "risk of erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used," and any additional
safeguards; and "the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional" safeguards would entail.
Relying on a due
process analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the
Daniel S. court concluded that Daniel was not provided due
process to exercise his right of protection from abuse.

The report of the New York State Commission on Child
Abuse indicates that in 1995 55 percent of child abuse and
neglect reports to the SCR were not registered (accepted) and
that 72.8 percent of those accepted were unfounded.
Therefore, only 12.5 percent of reported cases became

eligible for protective services.
Id. at 628-29, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
469 Id. at 628, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 294-95.
305 Id.
306 Id.
3w

Id. at 629-30, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 295.

308 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
309 Id. at 335.
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